The Coming Middle East War
The Israeli-Hamas (or you can really call it Palestinian because it doesn’t just involve Gaza) has been raging on for 94 days now, or a little over three months, with no apparent end in sight, at least to the people who have been following the conflict closely. Many are not aware of the rising (albeit slowly) escalation this situation poses.
Before the War
Rewinding the clock to October 7th, 2023, gives us a clear picture of the Middle East. Right before Hamas launched their attack, Israel was making headway into becoming the center point of a Sino-European trade relationship, even more tightly knit than the current relations. This would have seen Israel act like a mega toll, charging insurance for goods being shipped over land, then dropped onto tankers docked in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Ashdod, etc., and then eventually shipped to Europe, perhaps some going to the USA. One can see the potential revenue Israel would make from this exchange, as well as the countless other benefits that would entail it, such as technological devices being shipped inside their country and protection being provided by Europe and China, as both sides would not want to see this lucrative proposed “New Silk Road” disrupted in the event of a war.
Another development before October 7th was the reproaching of Israel and some of the Gulf states, like Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Arab countries not in the Persian Gulf, like Morocco and later Sudan. A normalization of ties on this scale would see Israel have influence over the majority of the M.E., with the exception of the northern belt running from Beirut to Baghdad. A situation like this would prove unacceptable to Islamists and Iran. Not to mention, a united Gulf state hostile to Iran would threaten their oil supply in the Persian Gulf (20% of world crude oil leaves this region).
The Present
Back to the situation before the 7th of October, from the perspective of Hamas, the Islamists, and Iran, a future like this would be simply unacceptable. A future in which Israel restores ties with all of the Arab world, with the exception of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, cannot be allowed to happen. So, from their perspective, it makes sense why an attack would be launched (I am not sure of the significance of the date other than that day being the 50-year anniversary of the Yom Kippur War); an attack would force Israel’s hand to respond, and they would be betting on Israel’s response being harsh enough to crash the diplomatic ties. And it has worked; some Gulf states have put a hold on the deal for now, and Sudan has reversed the diplomatic ties and done the opposite, reestablishing relations with Iran. Other Gulf countries, like the UAE and Qatar, have stated they would not cut off their ties but have warned Israel of their destruction in Gaza and how it would backfire on them in the future. Egypt, one of the primary beneficiaries of American aid, has maintained that the attack by Hamas must be condemned. However, they are one of the only Arab countries that have approved large supplies of international aid into Gaza, a move with which Israel still heavily disagrees, as they believe a total blockade of the Gaza Strip is the only way to squash Hamas for good.
The current situation on the ground does not remain favorable for Hamas. Nearly half of the Gaza Strip is occupied, but it is worth noting that even in the blue areas (IDF-controlled), there may still be localized fighting, etc. Mapping out Urban battles tend to be tricky due to how fast they can change, usually in the span of hours. Not to mention the various tunnels underground that span miles and can withstand bombs due to the depth of the tunnels. But the point stands that Hamas, at some point, will run out of tunnels, land, or ammunition, whichever finite resource you want to use, and will capitulate to the IDF, ending the war.
However, this way of thinking, prominent at the beginning of the war, has begun to fade away. What was a confident proclamation of “just a war between Israel and Hamas” has now changed to “a regional war with Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran is in the realm of possibility.” A sudden shift that did not come out of nowhere, when it was revealed that Israel was repeatedly asking Hezbollah to withdraw to the north of the Litani river, back and forth skirmishes between IDF soldiers and Hezbollah troops using ATGM nests sniping each other from kilometers away, and the most recent development of Israel striking deep into Lebanon, specifically Beirut, killing Hamas and Hezbollah officials.
This supports the theory, considering even when Israel began mobilizing to invade Gaza between the 7th and 30th, the majority of the most experienced and veteran troops weren’t deployed to Gaza but to the Lebanon border. And now, with Israel withdrawing thousands of soldiers from Gaza to (presumably) redeploy them to the North to face Hezbollah, whose ATGM squads have been a thorn in the side of Israel since the beginning of the Gaza conflict, However, the attacks have escalated in intensity and are more numerous than the previous year.
We cannot forget to mention the rise in insurance prices for container ships that the Houthis have been causing. A complete blockade (for ships destined for Israel) of the Red Sea, with the biggest attack to date having occurred just hours ago. Although no one has been killed and zero ships have been sunk, these attacks are enough for shipping companies to redirect their route around Africa and raise the price of insurance on ships still passing through the Red Sea.
When stepping back and looking at it from a regional standpoint, it is clear what is beginning to happen: an unraveling of peace (not including the 2011 Arab Spring) that most of the Arab states have enjoyed since the 2000s. A war on a scale that we haven’t seen since the Iran-Iraq war that involved almost 2 million soldiers on both sides and resulted in 1 million+ casualties over eight years. Except this time, it could involve almost the entirety of the Middle East rather than being localized to just the Iran-Iraq border. But the technology and weaponry that Iran has developed since the 1990s will surprise most; all it takes is a cheap kamikaze drone to sink a U.S. destroyer and kill 130+ sailors. We are in the age (again, it seems) of cheap, mass-produced weaponry; if one needs more evidence, look no further than the Russo-Ukraine conflict, in which both sides have developed and deployed thousands of FPV drones with artillery or bombs strapped to the bottom of the drone and rammed into a fortification, trench, tank, IFV, vehicle, or infantry. I’m afraid this war will turn out the same way, especially considering a good chunk of the attacks on ships in the Red Sea have been Houthini drones manufactured by Iran, although it would take a much bigger payload to sink a container ship than a T-90M tank or IFV.
Conclusion
The main takeaway from this should be preparation in case the conflict explodes into an all-out war rather than where it is currently with back-and-forth fighting behind Hezbollah ATGM squads and IDF soldiers or Hamas guerilla tactics. It may start out slowly at first, but when both sides feel escalation or confrontation is inevitable, some say we’ve reached that point and passed it already. Another good indicator of this is the recent development. Israel orders hospitals in North Israel to be on high alert; something similar played out shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine. Hospitals being set up or ordered to be on high alert is usually not a good sign for people in favor of de-escalation. The only way this cools off is if one side backs down, but at this very moment, this does not look to be the case. America would be very much involved and entrenched in another M.E. conflict that would never end.
